BLUF:
The outcome of conflict is based not merely on the balance of forces, but on political will, and despite the rapid turnover in Iranian leadership, Tehran appears confident that it can outlast Washington’s resolve.
ANALYSIS:
In assessing the potential outcomes of the Iran conflict - both in the sense of timing and of structure - we must recognize first that there are three primary actors - the United States, Israel, and Iran. There is coordination between the former two, but there does not appear to be a common vision of goals, leaving Iran room to exploit those differences. The differences are not merely political, they are structural. Even Iran’s conventional assets pose a significant threat to Israeli physical security, while without a viable long-range nuclear missile capability, Iran presents more of a disruptive than destructive challenge to the distant U.S. mainland. This difference will shape how each government is likely to respond to continued shifts on the battlefield, on further expansion of the conflict, and on the economic and social impacts at home.
Of the three primary actors, the United States’ ultimate goal remains the least defined. The current administration and those aligned with the President have offered several justifications for (and thus intents of) the current conflict. These include concerns over a renewed nuclear program, concerns over Iran’s conventional missile and drone program, a desire to overthrow the Iranian regime, a desire to take greater control of energy resources, and the desire to finally deal with a longstanding disruptive challenge from Iran.
In several cases, it is this latter idea that seems to be taking hold - that this U.S. administration is the only one bold enough to act on second-tier problems (like Venezuela or Iran) in order to shift U.S. focus to its more strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific. The problem with this reasoning is that it fails to identify a clear goal that would signal an end to military activity, and thus risks - as with other recent wars - a series of tactical military successes without a long-term strategic victory. The United States has already degraded Iran’s nuclear program, set back its strategic missile program, and disrupted the regime’s leadership structure. The Iranian threat to the mainland United States has been effectively reduced. We are nearing the point where the viable purely-military target set, at least from the air, has been effectively exhausted, and it is only the political considerations that allow the conflict to continue. Remaining targets would either degrade an already dire economic situation (oil export infrastructure, power plants, dams, railway crossings, etc) or would involve exquisite finesse and likely civilian casualties (targeting militias operating in urban areas, for instance).
Israel’s goals appear slightly more clear, though in many ways they mirror the latter goals (or reasoning) of the United States. For Israel, Iran is a long-standing strategic challenger in the region, close enough in proximity to threaten Israel’s survival, whether through its missile and drone program or its regional militant proxies. Given Israel’s compact size, even a limited Iranian nuclear capability could threaten the very survival of the state, representing an existential crisis. This differing risk perspective explains Israel’s continued opposition to negotiated U.S.-Iranian settlements that would not lead to the concrete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program at all stages.
For Israel, the lesson of North Korea is clear - failure to take military action will allow the regime to eventually acquire the nuclear capability, and once acquired, there is little room for any future disarmament. For Israel, the goal of the current conflict is to inflict the maximum possible damage against Iran's nuclear, missile, and drone programs and capabilities, degrade Iran’s political and military leadership, and break the back of Iran’s proxy network in the region. This round of the Iranian conflict, then, is an extension of Israel’s Gaza war following the October 2023 Hamas attack. While Israel is likely to bow to U.S. pressure to cease the direct strikes on Iran if Washington makes that decision, until that time the Israeli government will encourage the United States to pursue and destroy every possible target while Israel expands its moves against Hamas, Hezbollah, and any other Iranian-linked militant group, with the very clear intent to disarm and dismantle these movements.
It is this difference in U.S. and Israel goals that Tehran hopes to exploit. Iran has incrementally escalated its counterstrikes to target both U.S. Gulf partners, and to demonstrate a willingness to target the regional energy infrastructure. While the financial cost is high, compared to the United States Israel is better able to weather domestic social and political resistance to the conflict as Israel is inside the battle box, and thus its citizens are more willing to accept the cost of degrading potential threats. It is a war Israel as a nation is part of, and while there may be domestic complaints about tactics or operations, there is little push to simply stop targeting Iran. The United States, by contrast, is far from the warfront, and the only impact American citizens generally feel is related to the price of oil and its impact on transportation and other prices. Meanwhile, pro-Iranian botnets are spreading disinformation at a stunning pace, in order to undermine support for the war. Steep oil price rises, a volatile stock market, concern over longer-term oil disruptions, and fear of future terrorist attacks on U.S. soil weaken domestic U.S. support for the war, particularly when it was not in response to a specific action by Iran. With the midterm elections coming in November, there are rising concerns within the Republican Party that an extended conflict could undermine their chances.
In short, there is less social momentum in support of the conflict in the United States than in Israel. This does not guarantee that the United States will suddenly declare victory and cease the war, constraining Israel’s operations along with it, but it does mean that for Tehran, the center of gravity to target is U.S. social and political will, and that is best done by ratcheting up the impacts on global energy prices and convincing the American public that Iran is willing to go much further, by releasing a mass of mines in the Persian Gulf and by striking regional oil and gas export terminals. While Tehran remains constrained in its targeting of oil and gas infrastructure currently, it is clearly signaling both a capability and willingness to expand operations against that target set. This is less because Iran wants to pursue a scorched earth strategy and more as a tool of coercion to further erode U.S. political will and bring some end to the current round of conflict sooner rather than later.